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█ Abstract In this commentary on Sinhababu’s Humean Nature I will explore three lines of inquiry. The 
first asks about the explanatory power of the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning, by way of wondering 
about how desires and beliefs combine with one another. The second question continues along these lines, 
asking about the further conditions Sinhababu places on reasoning and whether a theory of reasoning can 
be normatively neutral. The third points out the need for more clarity in his account of intention by con-
trasting it with practical reasoning. 
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█ Riassunto Meccanica e psicologia del ragionamento pratico – In questo comment su Humean Nature di 
Neil Sinhababu intendo esplorare tre linee di indagine. La prima si interroga sul potere esplicativo della 
Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning, indagando come desideri e credenze si combinano reciprocamente. La 
seconda prosegue su questa strada, interrogando le ulteriori condizioni che Sinhababu pone sul ragiona-
mento e chiedendomi se una teoria del ragionamento possa essere normativamente neutrale. La terza in-
dividua il bisogno di maggiore chiarezza nella sua descrizione dell’intenzione, mostrandone le differenze 
rispetto al ragionamento pratico. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Desiderio; Credenza; Psicologia humeana; Intenzione; Ragionamento pratico 

SINHABABU’S HUMEAN NATURE OFFERS an 
incredibly comprehensive picture of Humean 
psychology, according to which our mental 
states are parsimoniously built of beliefs and 
desires, and according to which it is only the 
desires that do any motivating. 
In what follows I will, for the most part, be 
granting Sinhababu his Humean theory. While 
there are many ways in which one might ques-
tion this theory, and many ways in which it has 
been questioned, Sinhababu takes great care to 
respond to objections to his Humean picture. 
(To his credit, one also gets a clear sense of how 
he might respond to further objections.) And 
because he also takes great care in working out 
the Humean theory of motivation and explain-
ing how all its parts come together, and because 
Humeanism about motivation is so popular, it 
is worth exploring what follows when we take 
for granted the very fleshed-out and thorough-
going Humean vision he presents us with. 
I will be exploring three lines of inquiry. 
The first asks about the explanatory power of 
the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning, by way of 
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wondering about how desires and beliefs com-
bine with one another. The second question 
continues along these lines, asking about the 
further conditions Sinhababu places on reason-
ing and whether a theory of reasoning can be 
normatively neutral. The third points out the 
need for more clarity in his account of inten-
tion by contrasting it with practical reasoning. 
 
█  Combining  
 
«Desire that M is created as the conclu-
sion of reasoning if and only if the reasoning 
combines desire that E with belief that M 
would raise E’s probability».1 This is Sinhaba-
bu’s characterization of the Desire-Belief Theo-
ry of Reasoning, a component of the Humean 
theory of motivation. On this view, a certain 
kind of desire and belief combine, and their 
combination produces a certain new desire. As 
far as I can tell, there are a few different things 
we might have in mind in talking about men-
tal states combining with one another, and we 
cannot fully understand the Desire-Belief The-
ory of Reasoning without determining which of 
these Sinhababu subscribes to. 
The first way mental states can combine is 
simply by clicking together, as it were, and 
then being relatively difficult to separate. Let’s 
call this the puzzle piece model. On the puzzle 
piece model, when mental states A and B 
combine, they retain their individuality as A 
and B, as well as many or all of their original 
properties, but now travel together in one’s 
mental space. 
We can also talk about two mental states 
combining to form a third, new mental state. 
Let’s call this the offspring model. On the off-
spring model, when A and B combine, a pre-
viously nonexistent C is formed. On this 
model, it is constitutive of the combination 
that C is formed. If C had not formed, A and 
B would not truly have combined. 
Maybe two mental states can also com-
bine in such a way that each of the original 
mental states is destroyed, but a wholly new 
mental state is formed in the process. Let’s 
call this the cake model. Think of what hap-
pens when we combine the ingredients for a 
cake and then bake. Each of the ingredients 
is consumed during the process and a new 
thing is formed. The finished cake has many 
new properties. It has gained some properties 
the ingredients didn’t have, and lost some 
that they did. So on this model, A and B 
combine to form a new mental state C, and A 
and B are, so to speak, used up in the process. 
These three models – the puzzle piece mod-
el, the offspring model, and the cake model – 
aren’t exhaustive, but they provide usefully di-
verse models of how we do understand the idea 
of combination in general, and how we might 
understand it in the case of mental states. 
For us, the question at hand is whether all 
three models can be represented by reasoning. 
I suspect the answer is that only the second, 
and maybe third, could properly be called rea-
soning. An uncontroversial example of the 
offspring model is a simple modus ponens: 
We put two beliefs together and a third, dis-
tinct belief is formed. Less obviously, the cake 
model might be embodied by a reductio piece 
of reasoning: We put a few beliefs together, 
realize they entail something absurd, and end 
by rejecting the original claims. (I’m not con-
fident about this. It is difficult to say precisely 
what has happened in such cases.) 
From what Sinhababu says, it is clear 
which of the above models he subscribes to. 
A desire and a belief combine to produce a 
new desire. So his is the offspring model.2 But 
we might well wonder about different types 
of offspring models. For example, theoretical 
reasoning gives us one kind of offspring 
model where A, B, and C are all beliefs. 
Meanwhile, one of the central debates about 
practical reasoning is, to adopt my terminol-
ogy, which offspring model we should adopt. 
Are A, B, and C all the same sort of mental 
state (as they would be if there were all be-
liefs, per Joseph Raz)? Or are A and C inten-
tions, while B is a belief (as with John 
Broome’s analysis)? Or is A a desire, B a be-
lief, and C an intention (as many other ac-
counts go)?3 In this debate, Sinhababu also 
clearly stakes out his territory: A is a desire, B 
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is a belief, and C is also a desire. This view is 
notable because it is unusual, despite the fact 
that his view may be compatible with the 
second and third views, since he takes inten-
tion to be a desire situated in a certain way. 
The final section will examine this in more 
detail. 
At this point, one can’t help but wonder 
about the psychology and the mechanics of 
practical reasoning, about how desires could 
combine with beliefs to form new desires. 
Sinhababu’s answer is attention. According 
to him, desires have different basic proper-
ties. What he calls the Attentional Aspect is 
crucial for practical reasoning. It is the prop-
erty that desiring some end disposes one to 
attend to things associated with that end. So, 
for example, desiring that I drink some water 
disposes me to attend to streams, faucets, 
and glasses. Similarly, Sinhababu argues, the 
desire for an end and a means-end belief re-
garding that end can combine «when the de-
sire directs attention to the content of the be-
lief».4 Suppose I desire that I drink some wa-
ter, and also believe that filling a glass with 
potable tap water will enable me to drink 
some water. The Attentional Aspect of desire 
then disposes me to attend to streams, fau-
cets, glasses, and so on, and because some of 
those are part of the content of my means-
end belief, my desire and belief can combine. 
Sinhababu argues further that the Atten-
tional Aspect is a sufficient condition for de-
sires’ and beliefs’ combination in practical 
reasoning,5 though he acknowledges that at-
tentional resources might be diminished by 
things like fatigue or drunkenness. He under-
scores this view by saying that «[t]he Atten-
tional Aspect allows desire to bring itself to-
gether with belief, explaining the possession 
and exercise of capacities for practical rea-
soning».6 (In fact, on his account, attention 
explains how some beliefs combine with oth-
ers in theoretical reasoning, too. This is be-
cause we have a desire to know the answer to 
a certain question, and that desire activates 
our attention.) 
It seems to me that this view leaves the 
most important thing unexplained. Suppose I 
wonder why two magnets attract. Suppose 
also that you explain this by saying, «You’ll 
find that, unless something funny gets in the 
way, anytime they get close enough, they 
snap together». While close proximity is 
perhaps a sufficient condition for the attrac-
tion of two magnets, this explanation leaves 
the surprising things unexplained. One still 
feels left in the dark about how the attraction 
works. One doesn’t understand why they 
snap together at all. Why, for example, do 
magnets do this while eggs don’t? Is the way 
that planets attract each other the same? In 
the case of magnets, electro-magnetic theory 
gives us the fuller answer. But in the case of 
practical reasoning, Sinhababu doesn’t. 
For Sinhababu, if you desire E and you be-
lieve that A-ing will raise E’s probability, then 
you will desire A-ing. But if we want to know 
why this desire combines with this belief and 
why it produces that desire, it looks like we 
must be content with the answer that this is 
simply how things are. To be clear, this is not 
an objection to the theory, but a concern that 
not enough has been said to explain what is 
really interesting about practical (or theoreti-
cal) reasoning. 
However, there is more to Sinhababu’s 
story than attention, and perhaps we will find 
a fuller explanation there. 
 
█  The Syntax of Reasoning 
 
Sinhababu notes that there are syntactic 
constraints on the relevant desires and beliefs 
that can combine in practical reasoning. 
«One distinctive mark of reasoning», he 
writes, «is that it involves mental states 
quickly producing others because of syntactic 
relations between their contents».7 In other 
words, reasoning is a causal mechanism that 
occurs at least partly due to certain syntactic 
relations. Adding syntactic constraints is im-
portant, otherwise any causal transition be-
tween mental states might count as reason-
ing, and surely that lets too much in. If I see a 
bus and that triggers a desire for a cookie, I 
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obviously haven’t done any reasoning. 
But it is not clear what these syntactic re-
lations are meant to be. In particular it’s not 
always clear where Sinhababu places logical 
relations. Sometimes they sound like a spe-
cies of syntactic relation, other times the two 
categories seem coextensive. But we should 
be careful to distinguish them. There are syn-
tactic relations between our beliefs when we 
affirm the consequent because there are Ps 
and Qs floating around that get combined in 
a certain way. Affirming the consequent, 
however, is not permitted by logical rules. If 
the Desire-Belief Theory of Reasoning is just a 
causal story about how some mental states 
quickly produce others because of syntactic 
relations, then it is unlikely to be bound by 
logical rules. After all, people frequently do 
affirm the consequent, and it’s plausible that 
we make similar errors in practical reasoning. 
Given this, we need to determine whether 
the constraint on practical reasoning is syn-
tactic or logical. I think the view will be bet-
ter off if the constraint on reasoning is syn-
tactic. This is because, on this construal, the 
view is able to do something that can pose 
serious difficulty for accounts of reasoning, 
namely make space for bad reasoning – 
something that genuinely counts as reason-
ing, but fails to be good reasoning. Such rea-
soning may conform to syntactic relations 
but violate logical ones. If this is right, then 
when mental states quickly produce others 
because of syntactic relations between their 
contents, we will have reasoning. When these 
syntactic relations are also relations licensed 
by logic, we have good reasoning. 
I worry, however, that even adding a syn-
tactic constraint will not exclude enough cases 
from counting as reasoning. There are cases 
where some mental states quickly produce 
others because of syntactic relations between 
their contents, but fail to be reasoning. Take, 
for instance, syntactic relations between dif-
ferent desires. Suppose I desire that P and de-
sire that if P then Q, and this causes me to de-
sire that Q. It doesn’t seem like this should 
count as reasoning, even as bad reasoning. Or 
take cases of wishful thinking, where a desire 
that P be the case quickly produces a belief 
that P will be the case. Here is a very tight syn-
tactic relation between contents (namely iden-
tity), but the nature of the mental states 
makes these seem not like bad reasoning, but 
not instances of reasoning at all. 
While might be able to fix some cases by 
supplementing the view with substantive 
constraints on the syntactic relations al-
lowed, these examples suggest that we also 
need constraints on the mental states in-
volved. In both examples, the contents are 
related in the way we might want (modus 
ponens and identity, respectively), but seem 
not to count as reasoning because of the na-
ture of the mental states involved. Modus 
ponens is fine for belief contents, but not, it 
seems, for desire contents. Identity of con-
tents likewise is fine in the case of belief, but 
starts to look strange if we have one desire 
and one belief. 
The worry, though, is whether a purely 
descriptive theory can give us the constraints 
we need. These sorts of things do happen, 
but a purely descriptive theory does not seem 
able to explain it. It is admittedly a question 
for the psychologist, but I strongly suspect 
that we undergo non-reasoning, but never-
theless causal, mental transitions just as 
quickly as reasoning – perhaps even as fre-
quently. So there’s likely to be no statistical 
way of separating reasoning from non-
reasoning. We could try to add constraints 
on the relevant mental states involved, in ad-
dition to the syntactic relations of contents. 
But it will be hard, again, to present a princi-
pled, yet descriptive means of distinguishing 
the mental transitions that count as reason-
ing from those that don’t. 
On the other hand, one promising and nat-
ural way of precluding such cases from count-
ing as reasoning will involve deferring to some 
underlying norms, whether those be rules of 
classical logic or more tailored and specific 
rules pertaining to practical reasoning. This 
suggests a return to the view that we should ac-
tually look to logical, and not merely syntactic, 
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relations. Sometimes, too, it sounds like this is 
what Sinhababu wants. He says that one of the 
best-known functional properties of beliefs is 
that they bear logical relations to other beliefs, 
so that we can combine beliefs to do things like 
modus ponens.8 He also writes that «[a]ttend-
ing to evidence activates dispositions to believe 
in accordance with it, and attending to the con-
tents of logically related beliefs activates their 
dispositions to produce new beliefs by infer-
ence».9 Instrumental reasoning, presumably, 
works the same way: there is a disposition for 
certain desires and beliefs to combine and pro-
duce new desires (perhaps also by inference). 
Perhaps this is the needed supplement to the 
attention-induced combination we were 
searching for earlier. 
But there are also problems with this al-
ternative. First, how is it that a desire that E 
is logically related to a belief that M will make 
E more likely? Answering this requires a logic 
of practical reason, since the inference 
doesn’t obey any rules of classical logic. Some 
philosophers have argued against such a log-
ic, even while defending the existence of 
sound practical inferences (but which don’t 
conform to logical rules as we traditionally 
understand them). Maybe Sinhababu thinks 
there is one, but even so, spelling it out is no 
easy task. In any case, it’s worth noting that a 
skeptic about logical relationships in practi-
cal reasoning will either reject this immedi-
ately or else interpret the logical relationships 
in a way that is more amenable to their view. 
Next, even if we grant a logic of practical 
reason, it’s unclear how to characterize logi-
cal relatedness. It’s intuitive enough that a 
belief that P and a belief that if P then Q are 
logically related, and that they might have 
dispositions to produce the belief that Q. But 
are the belief that P and the belief that Q log-
ically related because we can form the belief 
that P&Q? If so, then all beliefs are logically 
related, and we again encounter the problem 
of allowing too much to count as reasoning. 
To avoid this, we could count mental 
states as logically related only with respect to 
certain (licensed) conclusions. The belief that 
P and the belief that Q would thus be logical-
ly related, but only with respect to the con-
clusion belief that P&Q. 
However, this raises an earlier question: 
Should we say that the beliefs Q and if P then 
Q are logically related with respect to the 
conclusion belief that P? In other words, are 
the beliefs involved in affirming the conse-
quent logically related, albeit badly or falla-
ciously so? There are two options. 
Suppose we answer in the affirmative and 
take beliefs involved in, e.g., affirming the con-
sequent to be logically related. This means that 
those beliefs are disposed to combine in this fal-
lacious way. Taking the descriptive psychology 
of this view seriously means that it would, in a 
way, be psychologically unhealthy or aberrant 
to fail to make psychologically common falla-
cies in one’s reasoning. In short, if we under-
stand the mental states and contents involved 
in fallacious reasoning as logically related and 
therefore as reasoning, then we have to say that 
such beliefs and desires are disposed to com-
bine in the fallacious way. 
If, on the other hand, we say that the be-
liefs involved in affirming the consequent are 
not logically related because fallacious, then 
we face two problems. First, as mentioned 
above, there ceases to be any gap between rea-
soning and good reasoning. Second, beliefs do 
frequently combine in fallacious ways, and 
what’s more, they do so as effortlessly as any 
other beliefs. But as before, the purely descrip-
tive Humean theory seems ill-equipped to ex-
plain why this would be. It is difficult to imag-
ine a principled, yet ultimately descriptive ex-
planation of why logically related beliefs 
would be disposed to combine to form logical-
ly licensed beliefs as conclusions, but wouldn’t 
be so disposed to form equally common but 
fallacious conclusions. This is because the 
most obvious answer relies on something 
normative: fallacious conclusions are bad ones 
and we shouldn’t draw them, even though, fal-
lible creatures that we are, we do. 
Sinhababu admits that he does not have «a 
general account of what distinguishes reason-
ing from other mental processes».10 I am not 
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suggesting that he develop a full account of 
this, but there is a related issue that his account 
cannot skirt. His reliance on combination as an 
explanatorily illuminating process demands an 
account of which things combine and why. 
And part of that explanation invokes syntactic 
constraints, or perhaps logical ones. I have dis-
cussed the outlook for both options. 
In the end, I think Sinhababu’s view is best 
off if it sticks with syntactic rather than logical 
constraints. Of these two options, this seems to 
be more consonant with his Humean picture. 
He could then provide a “just so” list of which 
things count as reasoning, but one determined 
by the actual psychological regularities we find 
in humans. On that view, it might just turn out, 
surprisingly, that if we regularly enough move 
quickly from desires that P to beliefs that P, it’s 
reasoning just the same as moving from a belief 
that P to a belief that P, albeit not as trivial nor 
as valid. After all, Sinhababu says that we may 
be surprised by some aspects of his view.11 Per-
haps this is simply the route he must pursue if 
he is to offer an illuminating account of mental 
state combination. 
 
█  Intention 
 
The first two sections have been concerned 
with Sinhababu’s account of practical reason-
ing. The first section focused on combination, 
and the second focused on an additional con-
straint on practical reasoning that might be ei-
ther logical or merely syntactic. This section 
will look more closely at the account of inten-
tion. This line of inquiry will continue to devel-
op the central theme of this paper, namely what 
combination is and how it works. 
Sinhababu characterizes intentions as 
properly situated desires.12 As he acknowl-
edges, this is a huge departure from what has 
become the norm, thanks in large part to Mi-
chael Bratman, i.e., the view that intention is 
its own irreducible mental state. Even those 
Humeans who depart from this dominant 
view typically take intention to be a desire–
belief pair, rather than the desire itself. For 
Sinhababu, however, an intention that φ is 
just a properly situated desire that φ. 
The desire’s being properly situated consists 
in the following. Roughly, this desire must 
combine with a belief that a situation will ob-
tain in which one’s performing a behavior B 
will make φ more likely. Furthermore, if this 
desire that φ were to combine with a belief that 
that situation currently obtained, then this de-
sire and belief would produce sufficient moti-
vational force to initiate action. More precisely, 
the requisite background conditions for a de-
sire to become an intention are (1) a future be-
lief (the situation will obtain), (2) an instru-
mental belief (one’s B-ing makes φ more likely), 
and (3) a disposition to produce sufficient mo-
tivation to initiate action. 
At first blush, this looks quite different 
from practical reasoning, but it’s worth com-
paring the two. In practical reasoning, one 
desires end E. For ease of comparison, let’s 
instead call the end φ. This desire combines 
with a belief that a certain state of affairs 
(originally called M) would make φ more 
likely. Practical reasoning combines these 
two and produces a new desire, the desire 
that the means obtains. 
Given this analysis, one would think that 
intention formation would be a species of 
practical reasoning. It’s the special case of 
practical reasoning where you not only desire 
the ends and understand an appropriate 
means-ends relationship, but you also be-
lieve, roughly speaking, that you can bring 
about the means. The main difference is that 
in practical reasoning a further desire is pro-
duced, namely the desire for the means. This 
is not true of intention formation. As Sin-
hababu puts it, «The role of reasoning in 
generating intentions is mostly to combine 
desires and beliefs so that the background 
conditions in (2) and (3) obtain for some pre-
existing desire».13 So combination in this case 
doesn’t produce a new mental state, but 
simply brings existing mental states together. 
If intention truly were a species of practical 
reasoning, then a desire for the means to obtain 
would be generated. And this, together with 
your knowing that you could bring about that 
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means (by B-ing) would, it seems, produce the 
motivation requisite to B. This last part is just 
Humean action. One might naturally think 
that it’s this desire – the desire to B (or the de-
sire that the means obtains), not the desire that 
φ – that constitutes the intention. 
It is not this view, however, to which Sin-
hababu subscribes. He is very explicit that 
the intention in question is not the intention 
that the means state obtains or that one B. 
The intention he aims to explain is the inten-
tion that φ. Of course it’s consistent with his 
view that an intention to B also forms, at 
least sometimes. This is surprising, I think, 
though not inconsistent. The nagging con-
cern is why combination looks different in 
each of these cases, and whether forming an 
intention involves reasoning or not. 
This is related to our first question: What 
is combination, and how does it work? For 
intentions, combination looks like the puzzle 
piece model. No new mental states are gener-
ated. The intention is identified as the origi-
nal and pre-existing desire, which is com-
bined with a couple of beliefs (and a certain 
psychological disposition). It retains all of the 
properties of desire, though it may acquire a 
new property or two in becoming so situated 
to become an intention.14 
Combination in practical reasoning, on 
the contrary, uses the offspring model. But 
then one wonders whether combination is 
really one sort of phenomenon, or different 
things going by one name. This is especially 
salient when we recall that we were using the 
generation of a new desire as a criterion for 
whether combination through practical rea-
soning had even occurred. So far, we lack a 
full story about combination, and the way 
combination works in intention and practical 
reasoning only serves to deepen the problem. 
Finally, I have a worry about the inten-
tion-as-desire view. In his critique of Gib-
bard’s quasi-realist account,15 Sinhababu ar-
gues that moral beliefs have structure that 
quasi-realists struggle to accommodate. For 
the quasi-realist a moral judgment is a moti-
vational mental state, which, together with a 
Humean account of motivation, means that a 
moral judgment must be fundamentally a de-
sire. Here Sinhababu reminds us of the con-
tradiction problem for quasi-realists, a vari-
ant of the Frege-Geach problem. The prob-
lem is that desires do not have the internal 
structure requisite to support contradictions. 
I can desire both P and ~P without being ir-
rational and without one of these two desires 
disappearing (unlike what happens if I dis-
cover I believe both P and ~P). 
For Sinhababu, though, this argument is a 
double-edged sword. One reason many have 
leaned toward cognitivism about intention (the 
view that intentions entail or are partly com-
posed of beliefs) is that intentions do seem to 
have an internal structure more akin to beliefs 
than to desires. Consider what Sinhababu dubs 
“exclusion”, a feature of intention according to 
which one intention excludes the formation of 
other, conflicting intentions. If I intend to meet 
someone at 8:00 am, then I won’t form a con-
flicting intention to be on a flight at 7:30 a.m. 
Similarly, if I discover that I have formed both 
intentions, I will revise one or both according-
ly.16 But if intentions are just desires, and we 
can desire contradictory things, then how do 
we explain exclusion? 
Sinhababu accounts for it by saying that 
«when I intend to perform some action, I 
usually believe that I’ll do it».17, Therefore, 
because these beliefs usually accompany in-
tentions (i.e., desires), we won’t intend con-
flicting things. But I worry about cases of in-
tending the improbable. He discusses the 
case of a basketball player who believes that 
his making a halfcourt shot is unlikely. In 
such a case, why should exclusion take hold 
at all? What precludes the player’s intending 
something else that is conflicting, but unlike-
ly, since after all he doesn’t believe that either 
of them will occur? (I take it that the “usual-
ly” included above is included to circumvent 
irrationalities, not rational responses to im-
probable outcomes.) There may be ways for 
the intention-as-desire view to account for 
exclusion, but the story will have to be at 
least a little more complex than the one Sin-




It will, I think, have to draw on other in-
tentions that are likely to form, and so on 
other beliefs. Perhaps in the case of the bas-
ketball player, for example, what explains ex-
clusion is the fact that the basketball player 
will not only form the intention that he make 
a halfcourt shot but also the intention that he 
try to make a halfcourt shot. This intention 
would form as a result of practical reasoning, 
assuming what I have said in the first half of 
this section is right. Then the latter intention, 
we are assuming, would cause the basketball 
player’s belief that he will try to make a 
halfcourt shot. And it’s this that precludes his 
also intending something contradictory but 
improbable, like missing the halfcourt shot 
by exactly 6 inches to the left of the basket. 
Because, in order to intend that, he would al-
so have to form the intention to try to miss 
by exactly 6 inches to the left. 
Whether the solution I’m offering works 
depends on other components of what I have 
suggested here. It depends on whether inten-
tion can operate in a way parallel to practical 
reasoning, which in turn depends on how we 
understand practical reasoning and on the 
model we use for combination. As is fitting 
for such an ambitious, systematic, and com-
prehensive view, solutions and further devel-
opments of the view will have to be deployed 
carefully in order to maintain the balance of 
the existing elements. 
 
█  Notes 
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